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AN EVENT DRIVEN SINGLE GAME SOLUTION FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATON IN 
A MULTI-CRISIS ENVIRONMENT 
 
Rashmi S. Shetty 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The problem of resource allocation and management in the context of multiple crises 
occurring in an urban environment is challenging. In this thesis, the problem is formulated using 
game theory and a solution is developed based on the Nash equilibrium to optimize the allocation 
of resources to the different crisis events in a fair manner considering several constraints such as 
the availability of resources, the criticality of the events, the amount of resources requested etc.   
The proposed approach is targeted at managing small to medium level crisis events occurring 
simultaneously within a specific pre-defined perimeter with the resource allocation centers being 
located within the same fixed region. The objective is to maximize the utilization of the 
emergency response units while minimizing the response times.  In the proposed model, players 
represent the crisis events and the strategies correspond to possible allocations. The choice of 
strategies by each player impacts the decisions of the other players. The Nash equilibrium 
condition will correspond to the set of strategies chosen by all the players such that the resource 
allocation optimal for a given player also corresponds to the optimal allocations of the other 
players. The implementation of the Nash equilibrium condition is based on the Hansen’s 
combinatorial theorem based approximation algorithm. The proposed solution has been 
 vii 
implemented using C++ and experimental results are presented for various test cases. Further, 
metrics are developed for establishing the quality and fairness of the obtained results.  
 1 
       
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Over the decades, crisis management has developed into a complex and multifaceted 
issue. The nature of a crisis or a disaster ranges from natural disasters like hurricanes and 
earthquakes to man-made crises like plane crashes, terrorist attacks, willful acts of mass 
destruction, industrial accidents, etc. With the development in infrastructure, the impact on a 
community in terms of damage to property and loss of lives due to the occurrence of a crisis 
necessitates the need for an organized and effective crisis management system. The scope of a 
crisis management system includes but is not limited to risk analysis, sensing, responding, 
monitoring and mitigating the effects of a crisis.  
 
1.1 Crisis Management 
 Every community is equipped with an array of emergency response units to cater to 
varied crisis scenarios. Effective recovery from a crisis requires immediate deployment of 
requested units to the crisis locations. The complexity of this arises from the heterogeneity of 
emergency response units, e.g., fire engines, ambulances and police cars. Furthermore, these units 
are distributed over a wide area and control-led by multiple organizations. Each crisis is unique in 
its severity, request for number and type of resources, location and potential growth. In the event 
of multiple simultaneous crises, it is critical to ascertain the severity of each crisis and allocate the 
optimum number and appropriate type of emergency units to each location. Depending on the 
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Fig 1.1 Crisis Scenario 
 
 3 
location and nature of the crisis, there may be additional requests for emergency units to prevent 
further deterioration of a situation. Although, some crises may be more critical than others, all of 
them need to be serviced immediately to prevent spawning of additional crises and further 
damage. The main aim of allocation of emergency services is maximization of the utility of 
existing and available emergency response units and minimization of response time to mitigate 
the effects of one or many crises. Fig 1.1 illustrates a scenario to facilitate further understanding 
of the situation. 
 
Let us assume a hypothetical crisis scenario in a city. 
• A plane crashes as it lands in the airport. It is a small passenger plane with 30-35 people 
including the crew. The crash has affected 2-3 planes parked at their terminals at the 
airport. 
• A fire breaks out in an apartment on the sixth floor of a high-rise building trapping the 
people within the apartment. The fire is slowly spreading to other apartments on the same 
floor and the one above. 
• A demonstration in front of the town hall has turned into a riot. A few members of the 
riot have become violent and are throwing inflammable objects all around the area.  
Each of the above incidents qualifies as a crisis although each varies in its degree of criticality 
and the number of resources it requires. The plane crash has the highest priority because of the 
casualties and the possibility of worsening. The airplanes have fuel in them which is highly 
inflammable and as other planes have been affected, the explosion has to be controlled before it 
spreads to the airport and causes further damage. The fire is next in priority and has to be 
controlled before it consumes the entire building and causes further damage to life and property. 
The riot comes next in terms of criticality. In the scenario, we consider three types of resources 
available – ambulances from the two hospitals, police cars from the police station and fire engines 
from the fire department. The plane crash and the fire scene would require fire engines and 
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ambulances. Both the locations might require a few police cars to regulate the population and 
direct people to safety. The riot scene would require a lot of police cars to control the crowd, 
maintain law and order and prevent stampedes. It would also need a few ambulances for riot 
casualties and fire engines to control fires started by rioters. A lot of factors like availability, 
distance, traffic conditions, etc determine how many resources are dispatched to the crisis 
locations and from which resource center. For example, there are two hospitals, Hospital A and 
Hospital B. It is important to note that Hospital A is closer to the riot than Hospital B. Hence, it is 
more practical to send more ambulances from Hospital A to the riot than Hospital B. However, 
the plane crash would receive more ambulances in total than the riot due to its higher criticality.  
It is highly possible that there may not be sufficient number of ambulances and fire engines as 
compared to the requests made by the crisis locations. Hence it is critical to make an optimal 
allocation of resources as under or over utilization of resources could cost lives. The allocation 
has to weigh in factors such as criticality of crises, request and availability of resources, distance 
and number of resource centers.  
 
1.2 Crisis Management Systems/Agencies 
 Several agencies have been set up and systems have been designed to monitor and 
mitigate the effects of crises. We will review some of the salient features of these agencies and 
systems. 
1.2.1 FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 The Federal Emergency Management Agency - a former independent agency that became 
part of the new Department of Homeland Security in March 2003 – has the task of responding to, 
planning for, recovering from and mitigating against disasters. FEMA can trace its beginnings to 
the Congressional Act of 1803, a piece of disaster management legislation, which provided 
assistance to a New Hampshire town following an extensive fire. In the century that followed, ad 
hoc legislation was passed more than 100 times in response to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and 
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other natural disasters. Over the course of the last few years, nuclear power plants, transportation 
of hazardous substances and civil defense responsibilities were added to this agency further 
compounding the complexity of emergency management.  
 
  
 
According to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2003 
– 2008: 
• Crisis/Disaster: Broadly defined to include disasters and emergencies that may be caused 
by any natural or man-made event 
• Response: Conducting emergency operations to save lives and property, including 
positioning emergency equipment and supplies; evacuating potential victims; providing 
food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need; and restoring critical public 
services 
Research 
Development 
Validation 
  Maintenance 
Review Law, Plans, 
Mutual Aid 
Agreements and 
Guidance 
 
Conduct 
Hazard/Risk 
Analysis 
 
Determine 
Resource Base 
Note Special 
Facets of the 
Planning 
Environment 
 
Fig 1.2 FEMA – SLG 101 Planning Process (Chapter 2) 
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• Recovery: Rebuilding communities so individuals, businesses, and governmental 
infrastructure can function on their own, return to normalcy, and are protected against 
future hazards 
Fig 1.2 shows an excerpt from the State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: Guide for All-Hazard 
Emergency Operations Planning – Chapter 2. These are guidelines to emergency preparedness. 
The grey boxes indicate those tasks which are relevant to resource allocation. Any proposed 
solution would require complete information about the resource base, topography, jurisdiction  
 
and classification of priority. After collecting information about resources and possible hazards, a 
system needs to have guidelines on distribution of resources. Fig 1.3 gives a brief outline of the 
resource management organization as proposed by Chapter 6 of FEMA – SLG 101. The shaded 
region has relevance to our work in terms of acquiring real-time resource updates, prioritization 
of events and dispatching resources. 
Resource Manager 
Needs Analysis 
• Receive requests 
• Prioritize events 
• Pass requests 
• Track request status  
• Report resource status to RM 
 
Supply Coordination 
• Procure personnel and units 
• Coordinate transport 
 
Coordination 
• Coordinate routing, 
reception, storage and 
handling of stocks 
Fig 1.3 FEMA – SLG 101 Resource Management Organization (Chapter 6) 
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1.2.2   INFOSPHERE – Sense and Respond Systems 
 The Caltech Infospheres Project [72] is devoted to research on compositional systems or, 
systems built from interacting components. One of the applications of this project includes a 
“sense and response” system. The basic purpose of the system is to hold a repository of data from 
multiple sources and normalize it to a standardized vocabulary. Certain conditions are specified 
that generate system alerts. The system monitors data from various institutions and when the 
specified condition is met, alerts are sent securely to the destination. The system can be 
programmed for specific applications, for e.g., an airplane switches to a different mode when the 
system detects an equipment malfunction. The data sources monitored for specific applications 
are immense in terms of volume, speed, heterogeneity and distributed nature. The proposed 
system is evaluated on the basis of – frequency of errors, response time, computational resources 
consumed, scalability and ease of adaptation. Fig 1.4 gives an overview of the control flow of the 
proposed system. 
 
 
 
 
Configure a set of sense-respond conditions for an application 
Monitor data from agencies to detect significant changes in data values 
Detect when specific (alert) conditions are met 
Disseminate secure alerts to destinations 
Fig 1.4   Infosphere – An Overview 
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1.2.3 CMS (Crisis Management System) 
 CMS [71] is a powerful crisis management software developed by Applied Science 
Associates, Inc. It has been designed as a tool for marine emergency response managers to model 
the impacts and biological effects of spill or a disaster. It can be used for training and simulation 
exercises, cost-benefit analysis and facilitate real-time response to marine disasters. Its interface 
has been designed for an oil spill, chemical spill, search and rescue mission, marine emergency 
and nuclear disaster. All the machines part of CMS are connected to a single resource database 
and enable immediate access to resource information. It is equipped with a Geographical 
Information System (GIS) to obtain real-time environmental information. It is used for 
management and distribution of information for an organization handling response and recovery. 
 
1.3 Motivation and Contributions 
 Multi-crisis management is a complex problem encompassing sensing, responding and 
recovering from crises. It is important to set good precedents for future occurrences to enable a 
better level of preparedness and response to crises to minimize destruction of life and property. In 
the previous section, we observe systems and agencies designed to improve and enhance the 
ability of emergency response managers to make effective crisis management decisions. They are 
primarily protocols or guidelines (like FEMA) for risk analysis, resource base analysis, and 
coordination of personnel and resource units. Some others are alerting mechanisms (like 
INFOSPHERE) used to monitor the activities of systems (a house, an airplane, city, etc). Systems 
like CMS are tools to monitor crises and provide real-time updates on them and the resources sent 
to mitigate their effects. While ample work has been done in collecting data regarding resources 
and classification of crises, there has not been significant work to automate the allocation of 
resources to crisis situations. The actual allocation of resources is made manually based on 
predefined guidelines and protocols and real-time information gathered from the scenes and is 
susceptible to human error.  
 9 
 This work proposes a model that uses the same information and enumerates feasible 
allocation strategies and determines an optimal set of strategies for managing each crisis. The 
proposed application is based on an optimization algorithm to obtain the best possible allocation 
that benefits all crisis locations. The multi-crisis scenario is modeled as a strategic game [22, 23] 
where the crisis locations are considered as players and each possesses a set of strategies that 
correspond to allocations from different resource centers. All the crises compete for the same set 
of resources and their adversarial nature is used to model them as players in a noncooperative 
game where each player tries to maximize his own utility. Each strategy of a crisis has an 
associated cost which is a function of resources contributed and the time taken to service a crisis’ 
request. The strategy sets are inputs to the optimization algorithm. The algorithm uses an 
objective function that associates a payoff with each allocation based on priority of a crisis, its 
request, number of resources available and time taken to reach the crisis. The optimization 
algorithm produces as an output an allocation of resources from each resource center to each of 
the crises. It is based on the principle of the Nash Equilibrium [22, 23, 69, 70] which provides a 
socially viable solution whereby any player which deviates from the equilibrium strategy will 
earn less than if it remained in its current strategy. 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
 The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 briefly looks at other algorithmic 
approaches to solving resource allocation problems and the approach used in this work. We 
explain the reasons for adopting game theoretic concepts to our problem. Chapter 3 introduces us 
to the formulation of the problem and the algorithmic design. We explain the constraints of the 
problem and the objective function used. Chapter 4 presents the experimental results followed by 
conclusions and an overview of future work in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED WORK 
 
Technological advances over the last few decades have drastically decreased the time 
delay between theoretical progress and its practical impact. One such subject which has been 
widely researched is resource allocation and it has found numerous applications in load 
distribution [10], production planning [11], computer scheduling [12] and many other areas. 
Since Koopman’s work [5] on the optimal distribution of effort in 1953, a significant number of 
papers [2, 3, 4, 6, 7] have been published on the subject. The allocation of resources is an 
optimization problem with the constraint – given a fixed quantity of a resource type, determine its 
allocation to a set of activities, such that the objective function or (in our case) the payoff function 
is optimized. Formally, this can be stated as follows [1]: 
Resource: minimize ( )nxxxf ,...,, 21  
   Subject to∑
=
=
n
j
j Nx
1
, 
   where 0≥jx  , j = 1, 2, …, n 
Here, jx  represents the amount of the resource that is allocated to activity j and f represents the 
objective function. N represents the total amount of the resource available and n, the total number 
of activities. The objective value ( )nxxxf ,...,, 21  could be a cost, a reward, profit or loss as a 
result of the allocation. If the resource is divisible, it can be represented by any nonnegative value  
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   Fig 2.1 Criteria for Resource Allocation 
and jx is a continuous variable. The resource may not be divisible if it represents persons, 
  jjj uxl ≤≤ ,  j = 1, 2, …, n 
vehicles, parts and so on. In the context of this work, jx is a discrete variable that can be 
represented only in nonnegative integer values. Sometimes, lower bounds (other than/greater than 
0) and/or upper bounds are imposed such that, it is required to allocate atleast jl  and at most ju  
resources to activity j [1].  
 
The choices of algorithms for resource allocation depend on how efficiently an objective function 
can be exploited. Some of the typical forms of objective functions are [1]: 
 
 
 
Constraints 
Resource Allocation 
Objective Function Algorithmic Approaches 
Discrete/ Continuous  
Lower/upper bound  
Separable 
Convex 
Concave 
Fair 
Minimax 
Dynamic Programming [51,52,53] 
Integer Programming [59,60,61] 
Lagrange Multiplier [56,57,58] 
Simulated Annealing [29,30,31] 
Genetic Algorithm [38,39,40] 
Branch and Bound [43,44,45] 
Miscellaneous Algorithms 
Game theory [73,74,75] 
Greedy [48,49,50] 
Tabu Search [65,66,67] 
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• Separable: ( )∑
=
n
j jj xf1 , where each jf is a function of one variable 
• Convex [9]: A function f(x) is convex if, on an interval [x, y], for any points 1a  and 2a in 
the interval [x, y], ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]2121 2121 xfxfxxf +≤+  . 
• Concave [9]: A function f(x) is concave if, on an interval [x, y], for any points 1a  and 
2a in [x, y], the function –f(x) is convex on that interval. 
• Minimax: Minimize ( )jjj xfmax ; and Maximin: maximize ( )jjj xfmin  
• Fair: Minimize g( ( )jjj xfmax , ( )jjj xfmin ), where g(u, v) is nondecreasing 
(respectively, nonincreasing) with respect to u(respectively, v) 
 
2.1   Types of Algorithmic Approaches to Resource Allocation 
Several algorithmic solutions and their generalizations have been proposed to obtain 
optimal solutions to the resource allocation problem. In this chapter, we will examine some of the 
widely used algorithms to solve the resource allocation problem and examine how game theory is 
well suited for modeling the solution in our case. Although we examine algorithmic approaches 
to solving discrete and continuous resource allocation problems, we emphasize discrete 
algorithms due to its relevance in this work. 
 
2.1.1   Dynamic Programming 
 Dynamic programming typically applies to optimization problems where we make a set 
of choices to obtain an optimal solution.  There may be several solutions to obtain the optimal 
value. A dynamic-programming algorithm can be categorized into four steps: 
• Define the structure of an optimal solution  
• Recursively define an optimal solution 
• Compute an optimal solution in a bottom-up manner 
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• Build an optimal solution from the information obtained in the previous steps 
In [13], a dynamic programming formulation is used for a time-optimal multi-agent task 
assignment problem. Here, m tasks are to be assigned to n agents, with m ≤ n, and one agent can 
perform only one task. A task assignment algorithm for a global optimal task assignment is 
obtained based on a problem specific recurrence relation derived using the Principal of 
Optimality [14]. Next, a dynamic programming styled time-optimal task assignment algorithm is 
constructed since each stage of the algorithm is based on the recurrence relation derived earlier. 
Dynamic programming is similar to the divide-and-conquer problem. However, the latter 
approach is not suitable for cases when there are common subproblems as it solves them 
repeatedly. Dynamic programming solves each subproblem just once and saves it in a table and 
thereby avoids recomputation every time the subproblem is encountered. However, the 
disadvantage of dynamic programming is that when it is applied to any multistage optimization 
problem, the dimensionality explodes when there are several state variables and each of them has 
large discretization  
 
Fig 2.2 Generic Algorithm for Dynamic Programming [15] 
 
• Define a non-empty state space X with a finite set of states 
• Define a finite set of actions, U(x) that can be applied from a state x Є X 
• Let k Є {1…K+1} where k is a stage. We assume that K is larger than the longest optimal path 
between any two states Є X 
• Let F = K + 1 where F is the final stage 
• ),(1 kkk uxfx =+  for kx  Є X and ku  Є U( kx ) where f denotes the state transition equation 
• Let 1x  denote the initial state and gx denote the state we want to reach or the goal state 
• Define an additive loss function L, 
   ∑
=
+=
K
k
FFkk xluxlL
1
)(),(   
where )( FF xl  = 0, if Gf xx =  and )( FF xl  = ∞ otherwise 
• Define a termination action Tu Є U(x), such that if Tu is applied to kx , then the action is 
repeatedly applied until stage K, and the state remains in kx until the final stage. Also, 
),( Tk uxl = 0 for any k and kx  
• Find Kuu .........1 that minimizes L 
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levels. In our case, the state variables would correspond to the number of units in each resource 
center. Also, the computational cost of the proposed algorithm grows rapidly with the number of 
agents making it infeasible for a large number of agents.  Inspite of the curse of dimensionality, 
we find dynamic programming being applied to a variety of resource allocation scenarios as 
described in [51, 52, 53, 54, 55].  
 
2.1.2   Integer Programming 
  Many optimization problems can be expressed as linear or nonlinear 
programming problems. A linear program is a problem which can be expressed as follows: 
  Minimize cx 
  Subject to Ax = b  x ≥ 0 
where x is a vector of variables to be solved and A is the matrix of coefficients, and c and b are 
vectors of known coefficients. “cx” is referred to as the objective function, and the expression “Ax 
= b” is called a constraint. A nonlinear program is a problem of the form, 
  Minimize f(x) 
  Subject to gi(x) = 0 for i = 1, …, m1 where m1  ≥ 0 
    hj(x) ≥ 0 for j = m1 + 1, …, m 
f(x) is a an objective function consisting of several variables and the other two functions are 
constraints. If the unknown variables are required to be integers, as is the case with this work, 
then the problem is referred to as integer programming. If the problem requires only some of the 
variables to take on integer values, it is called mixed integer programming. Although this is more 
realistic, it is harder to solve. Integer programming techniques can be applied over a substantial 
range of problem sizes and applications. The work in [16] integer linear programming is used to 
improve bandwidth efficiency in networks using a segment protection algorithm. An active path 
(AP) in a network is divided into several active segments (AS) which are protected by backup 
segments (BS). In case of a failure, the traffic is rerouted through a BS. Integer linear 
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programming is used to determine an optimal partition of a given AP into ASs and find the 
corresponding BSs. The work in [17] uses integer linear programming to obtain an optimal 
allocation of registers for general purpose processors and embedded systems. Although integer 
programming techniques are known to provide optimal solutions, in both the works above it has 
been found that they can be used for medium sized and not large networks (in the first case) and 
solution times are slow (in the second case). Integer programs are undecidable in the worst case 
and in some cases found to be NP-Hard. [59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64] are some works which use pure 
integer and mixed integer programming techniques for their resource allocation problems. 
 
2.1.3   Lagrange Multiplier Method 
 In mathematical optimization problems, Lagrange multipliers are used to deal with 
problems with constraints. They are used to find the maxima or minima of a multivariate function 
subject to a constraint [1]. 
  Optimize f(x, y) 
  Subject to g(x, y) = 0 
The Lagrangian is written as, L = f(x, y) + λ g(x, y) where λ is a constant called the Lagrange 
multiplier. According to Lagrange’s multiplier method, the simultaneous conditions are, 
   ;0=





∂
∂
yx
L
 ;0=





∂
∂
x
y
L
 
The goal is to find the maximum and minimum values taken on by f along the curve with the 
constraint on the points, g(x, y) = 0. The Lagrangian approach treats all variables and constraints 
in a symmetrical fashion so that problems involving numerous variables and constraints can be 
neatly organized. [18] uses Lagrangian methodology to schedule and allocate resources in a 
manufacturing unit. The objective is to efficiently use limited resources to meet dynamic 
customer requirements. Factories use a flexible manufacturing system by using production 
layouts to simplify production flow lines and increase productivity. Scheduling is used to decide 
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when to set up a cell for a production lot and the quantity of machines to allocate to the cell. The 
machine capacities, processing time and the machine type are quantified as constraints. The 
model uses Lagrange relaxation and forms a dual function by relaxing complicating constraints 
with Lagrangian multipliers. The original problem is divided into subproblems which are easier to 
solve. The model produces schedules which are 16%-29% within optimal. [19] is another work 
using a similar approach to optimally allocate resources in a distributed computing environment. 
Lagrangian relaxation and subgradient methods are applied to solve this problem. It was observed 
that an optimal solution would occur in an earlier iteration without converging. It has been 
observed that in the works above solutions to subproblems are not feasible and additional 
heuristics are applied to arrive at feasible schedules. [56, 57, 58] are some other examples of the 
application of the Lagrange multiplier method to the resource allocation problem.  
 
2.1.4   Simulated Annealing 
This algorithm is based on that of Metropolis et al. [9] to find an equilibrium configuration of a 
collection of atoms at a given temperature. In 1973, Pincus et al. [26] drew an analogy between 
this algorithm and mathematical minimization. It was proposed as an optimization technique for 
combinatorial problems by [27]. Simulated annealing is a random search technique which has the 
advantage of not getting trapped in local minima. It accepts changes that increase and decrease an 
objective function f. An increase in the change is accepted with the probability p [28], 
where





 −
=
T
f
ep
δ
. δt is the increase in f and T is a control parameter referred to as the “system 
temperature”. [41] suggests that the initial temperature 0T  has a significant impact on the 
performance of the algorithm. The algorithm requires a problem-specific annealing schedule, i.e. 
an initial temperature and the rules for lowering it as the search proceeds. Figure 2.2 shows the 
structure of a simulated annealing algorithm. One of the major problems in the implementation of 
simulated annealing lies in the difficulty of drawing an analogy between T and a free parameter in 
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a real-life problem. Furthermore, staying out of local minima is dependent on the choice of an 
annealing schedule, number of iterations performed for each temperature and the decrements of 
temperature towards the cooling process. [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] are some recent examples of the 
practical applications of simulated annealing as an optimization algorithm.   
 
 
Fig 2.3   Structure of Simulated Annealing Algorithm [28] 
 
 
 
Input and examine initial solution 
Determine initial value of T = 0T  
Generate and examine new solution 
Accept new 
solution? 
Update Stores 
Adjust temperature 
Terminate 
search? 
Start 
Stop 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
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2.1.5   Genetic Algorithms 
 The framework for genetic algorithms lies in the natural evolution of species searching 
for beneficial adaptations in a changing environment. Although the information encoded in the 
chromosomes of individual members changes by random mutation, it is essentially a combination 
of chromosomal material during breeding. In 1975, the incorporation of the principles of 
evolution into optimization routines was formally established in [36]. To use a genetic algorithm, 
we need to represent the solution as a genome (or chromosome). The algorithm takes as an input 
an initial population of solutions and applies the genetic operators (mutation, crossover) to evolve 
and find an optimum solution. The main aspects of applying genetic algorithms to real-life  
 
Fig 2.4   Structure of a genetic algorithm 
Start 
Generate random population of n chromosomes 
Create a new population by performing selection, 
crossover, mutation and accepting 
Replace the current population with the generated population 
Is end condition 
satisfied? 
Return best solution of the population 
Stop 
Evaluate the fitness f(x) of each chromosome 
Yes 
No  
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problems are: (i) defining an objective function; (ii) obtaining a genetic representation of the 
solution; (iii) defining the genetic operators. The efficiency of a genetic algorithm is dependent 
on the control parameters: (i) initial population, (ii) size of the population, N, iii) crossover 
probability, Pc, (iv) mutation probability, Pm. Genetic algorithms are similar to simulated 
annealing as both use probabilistic transition rules and use objective function information and not 
derivatives [28]. Genetic algorithms, although computationally expensive, can be easily 
parallelized as the evaluation of an objective function and constraints can be done simultaneously 
for a whole population. The figure 2.3 shows the structure of a genetic algorithm. [38, 39, 40, 41, 
42] are some of the recent works which use genetic algorithms to obtain optimal solutions for the 
resource allocation problem. 
 
2.1.6   Branch and Bound 
  Branch and bound is another algorithm used to solve optimization problems. It 
searches the entire solution space for the best solution. However, as the number of possible 
solutions increases exponentially, it becomes infeasible to enumerate all of them and hence we 
use bounds for the function to be optimized. The algorithm consists of three main parts [37]: 
• A bounding function to determine the lower bound for the best solution in the given 
subspace of the solution 
• A strategy for determining the next solution subspace to be analyzed. A branching rule to 
be applied if a subspace after analysis cannot be excluded and further subdivide the 
subspace into two or more subspaces 
• The performance of the branch and bound algorithm depends to a great degree on the 
initial search space fed to the algorithm.  
Convergence is ensured if the size of each generated subspace is smaller than the original one. 
[43, 44, 45, 46] are works which employ the branch and bound algorithm to find optimal 
solutions to their versions of the resource allocation problem. Although branch and bound  
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Fig   2.5   Flow of Branch and Bound Algorithm 
algorithms are favorable for discrete and continuous global optimization problems, they have 
high memory requirements.  
 
2.1.7   Greedy Algorithm 
 A greedy algorithm is one which follows a problem solving heuristic of making a locally 
optimum choice in the hope of obtain a globally optimum solution. Greedy algorithms do not 
always yield optimal solutions as they do not exhaustively examine all the possible solutions of a 
search space. The basic elements of a greedy algorithm are [47]: 
• A solution space from which the solution is created 
• A selection function to choose the next best element to be added to the solution 
• A feasibility function to examine an element’s eligibility to be added to the solution 
• An objective function to calculate the value of the (full or partial) solution obtained  
• A solution function to determine if the complete solution has been reached 
Greedy algorithms are rarely used to obtain optimal solutions and usually form the basis of a 
heuristic approach. Even though there maybe problems which can be solved using the greedy 
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approach, establishing their optimality is non-trivial. [48, 49, 50] are examples of works use the 
greedy approach to solve resource allocation problems. Typically, greedy approaches are not used 
because of their unreliability in providing optimal solutions as is proved in the case of the work in 
[50].  
 
2.1.8   Tabu Search 
 A Tabu search is a global optimization algorithm which is a meta-heuristic imposed on 
another heuristic. In 1977, Fred Glover introduced this approach of moving through a solution 
space and using memory techniques to avoid cycling. The algorithm records moves in a Tabu list 
and penalizes it if it takes the solution to a point in the solution space that has been previously 
visited. Hence, the algorithm avoids getting trapped in cycles. Tabu search is still an evolving and 
highly researched technique of optimization. Although Tabu search provides comparable or 
superior solutions to optimization problems, it does not guarantee optimality. Also, the 
construction of a Tabu list to keep a record of the moves is heuristic. [65, 66, 67, 68] are some of 
the recent applications of Tabu search to practical problems.  
 
2.2   Why Game Theory? 
 Game theory is a tool for modeling and analyzing conflict and cooperation between 
decision makers called players [20]. Such a situation occurs when multiple decision makers with 
different objectives act on a system or share resources. Game theory is considered to have been 
formalized with the publishing of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s The Theory of Games and 
Economic Behaviour in 1944. Game theory provides a natural framework for the modeling of the 
crisis scenario in this thesis. In the context of this work, we use noncooperative games due to the 
competitive nature of the players (or, crises in our case). Two or more crises compete for a 
limited number of emergency units from various centers. They have a finite set of actions or 
allocation strategies available to them, the choice of which leads to a well defined numerical 
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payoff associated with the each combination of strategies and for each crisis. [21]The strategy 
selected by a crisis depends on three parameters:  
• Strategy space which consists of the set of strategies (allocations) available to the crisis 
• Information about the other crises (priority, distance from resource center) 
• Payoff or utility function which quantifies the satisfaction a user can get from an outcome 
Every player attempts to maximize his gain in the game. A significant aspect of game theory is 
that each player’s decision is based on the decision of every other player and hence, each player 
can optimize his gain with respect to every other player. This is quite useful in modeling the crisis 
scenario where the overall optimization is feasible only if each crisis has been satisfied with 
respect to all other crises. The adversarial nature of the game and the interdependence of each 
player’s objective function on the decisions of the other players require the resource allocation 
strategy to take into account all the other players’ objective functions. The Nash solution in game 
theory provides an equilibrium solution taking into account the objective functions of all players. 
A significant aspect of game theory is that it has been proven that a finite noncooperative game 
has at least one Nash equilibrium [22]. This is motivation for us to use the Nash equilibrium as 
we are guaranteed an equilibrium strategy set for a crisis scenario. 
 
2.3   Game Theoretic Concepts  
 Games, as represented in game theory, consist of four essential elements – players, 
actions, payoffs, and information. These constitute the rules of the game. Depending on the 
information available, players try to maximize their payoffs by choosing strategies.  
• Players are the individuals/ entities who make decisions. Each player’s goal is to 
maximize his utility by a choice of actions 
• An action or strategy of player i, denoted is , is a decision he can make. Player i’s 
action iS = { is }, is the entire set of actions available to a player.  
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• By player i’s payoff ),...,( 1 ni sspi , we mean the utility received by player i after all 
players have decided their strategies and the game has been played; or 
The expected utility received as a function of the strategies chosen by the player i and the 
other players 
There are two kinds of strategies: pure and mixed [22] 
A pure strategy maps each of a player’s possible information sets to one action.                               
    iii as →ω:  
A mixed strategy maps each of a player’s possible information sets to a probability distribution 
over actions 
   ( )iii ams →ω:  Where m ≥ 0 and ( )∫ =
iA
ii daam 1  
Here iω refers to the information set. 
A strategy combination ( )nsss ,...,1= is an ordered set consisting of one strategy from each of 
the n players. Every player in a game maximizes its payoff and arrives at an equilibrium state. An 
equilibrium ),...,( **1* nsss = is a strategy combination of the best strategy for each player in an n-
player game. The strategy combination *s (a set of strategies) is a Nash equilibrium is, if any 
player which deviates from its strategy will earn less than if it remained in its current strategy. 
Formally, this can be stated as, 
   ( ) ( ) iiiiii sssssi ',,',, *** ∀≥∀ −− pipi  
The inputs required to formulate Nash equilibrium are: 
• Strategies available for each player 
• Number of players in a game 
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Some of the major categories of classifying games are as follows [25]: 
• Number n of players – A game can consist of one, two or n players 
• Number of strategies of players – This may be finite, a discrete infinite or a continuum 
• Zero-sum, constant-sum or general-sum – In a zero-sum game, the numerical payoffs to 
the player after any possible play of the game sum up to zero. A constant-sum game is 
one where the sum of all payoffs to the player is the same for any outcome. A general-
sum game includes the other two. 
• Cooperative and noncooperative - In cooperative games, players communicate with one 
another and can make binding commitments as opposed to noncooperative games 
• Complete and incomplete information 
• Single-stage or multi-stage games 
Non cooperative games can be further classified into strategic (normal form) games and extensive 
form games. 
• A normal form game is a game of complete information played between n players, each 
having a strategy set, iS  and a payoff function ip  where ∏ ≤ ℜ→ni ii Sp : . If there are 
a finite number of strategies, we can define a normal form game as a matrix. In such a 
game, each player simultaneously selects a move ii Ss ∈ and receives a payoff 
( )ni ssu ,...,1  
• An extensive form game is one which can be represented as a connected tree with no 
cycles and a distinguished node where each node represents a decision made by a player. 
A function specifies which player moves at a node, what actions are available, and which 
node comes next for each action [24].  
For the modeling of the problem stated in this work, our definition of a finite game is a 
noncooperative n-player game, with each player associated with a finite set of pure strategies; and 
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corresponding to each player, i, a payoff function ip , which maps all the n-tuples of pure 
strategies into real numbers. A tuple is a set of n strategies with each strategy associated with a 
different player.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FORMULATION OF A GAME 
 
 The automation of the allocation of emergency response units is a logical step in crisis 
management to minimize if not completely eliminate human errors in decision making. In this 
work, we propose a game theoretic framework to address the problem of allocation of resources 
to multiple crises. In drawing upon the concepts of game theory and consequently Nash 
Equilibrium we obtain a framework in which we can address the issue of minimization of 
response time, maximization of utility and fairness of the allocation. The idea of using a Nash 
solution in the context of resource allocation is not new and has been implemented in several 
areas [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78]. In this chapter, we illustrate the transformation of a multi-crisis 
environment into a noncooperative strategic game. 
 
3.1 Crisis Scenario 
 We revisit the example presented in Chapter 1, Figure 1.1. Consider a hypothetical crisis 
scenario as described in the figure – a plane crash, a fire and a riot. Tables 3.1 to 3.4 contain 
information about resource types and availability, crisis requests, crisis priorities and time taken 
to reach crises from each of the resource centers. In the given scenario, we note that the 
requirement of crises exceeds the capacity of the resource centers. Typically, if the number of 
resources available for dispatch were less than or equal to the requests made by crises, the 
resource manager is left with the task of determining the distribution of resources from resource  
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Table 3.1   Resource Types and Availability 
 Resource 
Centers  
Resource Types 
 
Hospital A Hospital B Police 
Station 
Fire 
Department 
Total 
Availability 
Ambulances 8 10 - - 18 
Police Cars - - 16 - 16 
Fire Engines - - - 14 14 
 
 
Table 3.2   Crisis Types and Requests 
Resource Types  
Crisis  
Ambulances Police Cars Fire Engines 
Plane Crash 11 6 10 
Fire 8 3 6 
Riot 3 9 1 
Total Request 22 18 17 
 
 
Table 3.3   Crisis Priorities 
Crisis  Priority (1 - 10)  
Plane Crash 9 
Fire 7 
Riot 3 
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Table 3.4   Time (in minutes) Taken to Reach Crises 
Resource Centers  
Crisis  
Hospital A Hospital B Police Station Fire Department 
Plane Crash 30 7 31 24 
Fire 18 15 33 8 
Riot 8 11 13 3 
 
 
centers between crises based on time taken to reach each crisis. Shortage of resources is not an 
issue and every crisis is guaranteed satisfaction of its request. However, in the current scenario, 
the resource manager has the additional task of determining the optimal allocation in the face of 
shortage and possible starvation of lesser priority crises. For example, there are 10 + 8 = 18 
ambulances. However, the total request for ambulances is 11 + 8 + 3 = 22 > 18 ambulances. 
There are two hospitals, A and B and it is important to note that A is closer to the plane crash B 
while allocating resources. Not only does a resource manager have to decide how many 
ambulances have to be dispatched from Hospital A and B, he has to decide on an optimal 
distribution based on severity and distance from crisis due to the shortage of ambulances. In our 
methodology, we obtain an optimal solution for each type of resource separately, i.e., we 
determine an allocation for ambulances, police cars and fire engines separately.  
 
3.2 Modeling of Crisis Scenario as a Noncooperative Strategic Game 
 We apply game theoretic concepts to the crisis scenario resource allocation problem. As 
mentioned in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, the main elements of every game are players, actions, 
payoffs and information.   
 In our model, each crisis is modeled as a player. The objective of each player is to 
maximize its utility by choosing actions most beneficial to it The actions, in this case, will be the 
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allocations to resource centers. For example, the plane crash, fire and riot have requested for 6, 3 
and 9 police cars respectively. The action of sending 6 police cars to the plane crash, 2 police cars 
to the fire and 8 police cars to the riot constitutes an allocation. In the context of this work, we 
refer to the actions as strategies. The utilities are the payoffs received as a function of actions 
chosen by other players. The framework rests on the modeling of the payoff function as it 
captures the effect on other crises when one crisis chooses a particular strategy. The information 
available to the players corresponds to requests, availabilities, priority and response time.  
 The conflicting objectives of the crises (players) contribute to the noncooperative nature 
of the game. None of the crises make prior commitments to share or lend resources before the 
game is played. This is a game of complete information as we play the game on the assumption 
that we have the latest information updates on the resource availability and crisis requests. Also, 
the information regarding time taken to reach a crisis location is assumed to be accurate. All the 
crises will make their selections simultaneously in a game and the game can be represented in a 
matrix where each cell represents a payoff value. Hence the game is a strategic or normal form 
game where all crises have finite number of strategies in their sets and the players’ actions are 
mapped to a probability distribution. 
 
3.3 Notations 
 The following notations are used in this work: 
n Number of crises, n Є N 
C Set of crises, C = {C1, C2, C3,.....Cn} 
m Number of resource centers, m Є N  
R Set of resource centers, R = {R1, R2, R3.....Rm} 
Q Set of requirements of all crises, Q = {q1, q2, .....qi, .....qn}  
qi Number of resources requested by crisis Ci where qi Є N  
O Set of resources available at resource centers, O = {o1, o2, ......oi, ....om}  
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oi Number of resources available at resource center Ri where oi Є N 
S Set of strategies of all crises, S = {S1, S2,....Sn}  
Si Set of strategies of crisis Ci, Si = {si,1, si,2,.....,si,gi} 
gi Total number of strategies in Si 
si,j jth strategy of the ith crisis, si,j Є Si 
rk Number of resources contributed by kth resource center, rk ≤ ok 
Li Priority of ith crisis, i = 1, 2, .... 10 where 1 is the lowest and 10 is the highest level 
T Set of response times of resources from resource center to crises, where T = {ti,j} 
ti,j Time to by jth resource center to reach ith crisis 
NSi Set of strategies constituting the Nash Equilibrium solution 
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CHAPTER 4 
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION MODEL USING NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 The optimal allocation of resources in the crisis scenario is dependent on the modeling of 
the problem. In the previous chapter, we observed the transformation of such a scenario into a 
noncooperative game as it provides a framework for analyzing strategic interactions. In this 
chapter, the details of this transformation are presented. We propose a definition of a strategy in 
the context of this thesis and elaborate the process of the formulation and pruning of the strategy 
space. The basic idea behind this approach is to apply heuristics to eliminate strategies which 
contribute to infeasible and “poor” solutions. Another goal is to control the explosion of the 
strategy space as the dimension of the problem increases. The computation of a Nash Equilibrium 
increases in complexity as the strategy space grows and hence it becomes necessary to prune the 
strategy space. After the strategy spaces are constructed, we play a noncooperative strategic game 
and obtain a probability distribution over the strategy set of each crisis which is used to determine 
the allocations.  
 
4.1   Structure of a Strategy 
 A game is modeled around its information set and a strategy captures the essence of this 
information in formulating an “action” for a player. Each player can play the game by selecting 
an action from its own set of “actions” or strategies, Si. The definition of an “action” or a strategy  
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 Fig 4.1   Formulation of a Strategy 
 
plays a significant role in determining the outcome of any game. In our crisis scenario model, the 
information available consists of, 
• Number of crisis locations, 
• Number of resource centers, 
• Time taken to travel from the resource centers to each crisis, 
• Priority of each crisis 
• Number of resources requested by each crisis 
 
The crises are modeled as players and the amount of resources allocated to them constitutes a 
strategy. Let C = {Ci} for i ≤ n, be a finite set of crises and R = {Rj} for j ≤ m be a finite set of 
resource centers, where n ∈  N is the number of crises and m∈N is the number of resource 
centers. Let iS  be the finite set of pure strategies available to crisis i∈  C. In the context of this 
work, we define a strategy as an n-tuple consisting of non-negative integers, one for each of the m 
resource centers. We write, 
)...,..,( 21, mkji rrrrs =  Nrk ∈∀   and   iji Ss ∈,  
where jis ,  denotes the jth strategy of the ith crisis and rk is number of resources contributed by 
resource center Rk from its pool of resources.  
R1 
R3 
R2 
R4 
C1 
s1, j = (r1, r2, r3, r4) 
 
Resource Center 
Crisis 
r1 
r2 
r3 
r4 
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4.2   Generation of Strategies 
 The concept of a noncooperative, normal form game is used in this work. All the players 
move simultaneously in a game which can be represented in a matrix form. Hence, it becomes 
necessary to enumerate all possible and feasible allocation strategies before the game is played. 
With each resource center equipped with rk resources, there are o1*o2*…ok*…om different 
possibilities of allocating resources from the different centers to a crisis. Every crisis has its set of 
allocation strategies, 
{ })(21 ,...., igi sssS =  where   g(i) ≤ o1*o2*…ok*…om , g(i)∈N, i = 1,2, …, n  
We use a recursive algorithm to generate the combinations of allocations that each crisis can 
select from. This is repeated for each of the crises. Figure 3.4 shows the algorithm used to 
generate these combinations. During the process of generating the strategies, we apply certain 
constraints on them to eliminate infeasible strategies.  
 
Fig 4.2 Generation of Strategies 
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Fig 4.3 Algorithm to Generate Strategies 
 
4.2.1   Pruning of Strategies 
 Since this is a game of complete information, the number of resources requested by a 
crisis location is known. During the allocation of a strategy to a crisis, it is imperative that a crisis 
is not allocated more resources than it needs. This is to avoid unfair allocation and wastage of 
resources. Resources that were allocated in excess of the requirement could have been used for 
crises whose needs are more urgent or for other crises which might occur.  
 Let Q = {qi} be the set of requirements of all the crises where i = 1, 2, ... n and qi∈N. 
Similarly, let O = {oj} be the set of the resources available at the resource centers where j = 1, 2, 
…, m and oj∈N. We apply our first constraint to the strategy generation process.  
For any strategy, si, j ∈Si, ∑rk ≤ qi    where i = 1, 2, …, n and k = 1, 2, …, m ----------    (1) 
 
 The above statement implies that in any strategy si, j belonging to crisis Ci, the sum of all 
the entries in the strategy tuple should not exceed the requirement qi of that crisis. For e.g., if 
crisis C1 requires 4 resources and it has two strategies – s1,1(1,2,1) and s1,2(1,2,2), the strategy s1,2 , 
2nd strategy of  crisis C1, is invalid as 1+2+2 = 5 > 4.  
 While generating strategies, it should be kept in mind that the individual entries in a 
strategy tuple should not exceed the availability of the corresponding resource center. Hence, we 
arrive at the second constraint on the strategies.  
Algorithm: GenStrat - Generation of strategies for each crisis 
Input: Resource array containing number of resource units in each center - R[m], Number of 
resource centers m, Crisis array containing requests of each crisis – C[n],Number of crises n 
Output: Set of strategies Si for each crisis 
 
Declare T[m] ← Temporary array 
Declare head ← Pointer to ordered list of strategies  
 
for crises in Ci , i  ←  1 to n 
 Strategy Set Si   ← Call RecStrat (R, m, C, n, T, 0, head) 
end 
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For any strategy, si, j ∈Si, rk ≤ ok    where i = 1, 2, …, n and k = 1, 2, …, m -------------    (2) 
 
The above condition indicates that in any strategy si,j belonging to crisis Ci, the individual entries 
in the strategy tuple i.e. si, j = (r1, r2, r3 ,… rk,…, rm), should not exceed the corresponding resource 
center’s total capacity i.e. r1 ≤ p1 , r2 ≤ p2 , r3 ≤ p3 ,… rk ≤ pk ,…, rm ≤ pm. For e.g., Let there be three 
resource centers R1, R2 and R3, with capacities 3, 4 and 2 units respectively. A strategy si, j = (4, 3, 
2) (jth strategy of ith crisis) is invalid as the first entry in the tuple corresponding to the 
contribution of resource center R1 is 4 whereas the capacity of R1 is 3.  
 
 
Fig 4.4 Recursive Algorithm to Generate Strategy Set for each Crisis 
 
4.2.2 Cost Function 
 In modeling this problem, we provide the user with an option to select n best strategies 
from each crisis’s set and play the game. These strategies are ordered in ascending order of cost 
to the crisis. Here cost is not tangible and is used as a measure of practicality. The objective 
Algorithm: RecursiveStrat - Generation of strategies for each crisis 
Input: Resource array containing number of resource units in each center - R[m], Number of resource 
centers m, Crisis array containing requests of each crisis – C[n],Number of crises n, Temporary array 
T[m], Variables curr, Pointer to ordered list of strategies head 
Output: Strategy set Si 
 
temp = curr + 1 
if temp == m then 
 last = 1; 
else 
 last = 0; 
end 
 
for resource units in Ri , i  1 to curr 
 T[curr] = i; 
 if last == 1 then 
  head  Call AddStrat 
 else 
  head  Call RecursiveStrat (R, m, C, n, T, curr+1, head) 
 end 
end 
return head 
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behind the ordering is to sort the strategies by those that provide the greatest number of resources 
in the shortest possible time. In a strategy, we compare the time taken to reach a crisis from each 
resource center and the number of resources contributed by that resource center as the factors in 
determining the cost of that strategy. 
Let T = {ti, j} be the set of measures of time taken to reach each of the crises from the resource 
centers. ti, j is the time taken to reach the ith crisis from the jth resource center. Here i = 1, 2, …, n 
and j = 1, 2, …, m where n is the number of crises and m is the number of resource centers. For 
any strategy, 
Cost (si, j) = min 






m
miii
r
t
r
t
r
t
,
2
2,
1
1,
,.......,,  for any strategy )...,..,( 21, mkji rrrrs =  …….. (3) 
Cost (si, j) measures the ratio between the time taken to reach a crisis i from each of the resource 
centers in a strategy tuple si, j and the number of units contributed by each of the resource centers.  
 It is not uncommon for two strategies to have the same cost. In such a case, we examine 
the two strategies and look for the next lowest value of the ratio in the tuples. The strategy with 
the next lower value is ranked higher among the two strategies being compared. Let Cost (si, j) = 
min 
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 where (si, j) and (si, k) are jth and kth strategies of crisis i.  
If a = b, then compare min
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Fig 4.5 Flowchart Illustrating Ordering of Strategies 
 
Yes 
Generate Strategy 
Calculate Cost 
Is there another 
strategy (s) in the 
ordered list with the 
same cost? 
Is the next lowest cost in 
the tuple different from 
next lowest values in the 
other strategy (s) with 
the same cost? 
Compare the sum of the resources contributed by the strategy 
with the other strategy (s) with the same cost. 
Add strategy to the ordered list of strategies in the 
appropriate place in ascending order of cost 
The strategy with the next 
lowest value is ranked higher 
The strategy contributing the higher 
number of resources is ranked higher 
No 
No 
Yes 
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Fig 4.6 Algorithm to Add a Strategy to a Strategy Set 
 
The process above (4) is repeated until we find two unequal costs. If two strategies being 
compared have identical
k
ki
r
t
,
values in their tuples, we compare the two strategies for the one 
which contributes the higher sum total of resources to the crisis. The strategy contributing the 
higher number of resources is ranked higher among the two strategies being compared,  
i.e. compare ∑rk where k = 1, 2, ..., m in (si, j) and (si, k) for the higher value ....................... (5) 
 
We perform the ordering of the strategies at the time of generation to avoid the additional 
overhead of sorting a huge list of strategies at the end thereby adding the time taken to sort 
strategies of each of the crises to the overall computation time. Figure 3.5 shows the process of 
ordering of strategies. 
Algorithm: AddStrat - Add strategy to strategy set of each crisis 
Input: Strategy S[m], Number of resource centers m, Pointer to ordered list of strategies head, Crisis 
array containing requests of each crisis – C[n],Number of crises n 
Output: Pointer to ordered list of strategies head 
 
Declare sum ← Temporary Variable 
 
for resource units in Si , i ← 1 to m 
 sum ← sum + Si 
end 
 
if  sum  ≤ C[present crisis] then 
 Compute cost of strategy S 
 Determine order strategy in list of strategies based on cost 
 Add strategy to strategy set   
end 
return head 
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Figure 4.7   Normal Form Game Representation 
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4.3   Payoff Modeling 
 A normal form representation of an n-player game is specified with, 
• A finite set of n players, 
• A finite set of strategies S = {S1, S2,..., Sn}for each player 
• A utility/payoff function ui to be applied on the set S 
Figure 3.7 shows the typical representation and our representation of a 2-player game. In (a), the 
strategies of player 1 are vertical and the strategies of player 2 are horizontal. Each cell has two  
entries – the first entry is the payoff to player 1 and the second entry is the payoff to player 2 
when player 1 and player 2 choose the strategies at the far left and top respectively. Similarly, in  
 (c) the matrix is divided into two parts. Each part is similar to (a) but represents a payoff when a 
third player chooses its first strategy (left half) and its second strategy (second half). In (b) and 
(d), we divide (a) into two matrices and (c) into three matrices respectively, one for each player’s 
payoffs for choosing a particular combination. 
 
4.3.1   Creation of Payoff Matrices 
 A normal form game can be represented as a matrix. For the purpose of our 
implementation we create n payoff matrices, one for each crisis. In our representation of the 
payoff matrices in Figure 3.8, the first column of each crisis’s matrix holds its strategies, one on 
each row starting from the second row. The first row of the crisis’s matrix holds the combinations 
of strategies selected by all the other crises, one on each column starting from the second column. 
The ‘X’ in the first matrix is for the payoff for the first crisis when C1 selects s1,1 and C2 selects 
s2,1 and C3 selects s3,1. 
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Fig 4.8 Structure of Payoff Matrices for Crises 
 
4.3.2   The Payoff Function 
 In any game, the best action for any player depends on the actions of the other players. A 
payoff to a crisis for choosing a particular strategy when the other crises make their selection can 
be represented as a gain to the crisis or a loss to the other crises. In our model, we depict it as a 
summation of the losses to the other players and each player tries to maximize this loss to other 
players. The payoff to a crisis is representative of the loss incurred by the other crises on the 
allocation of a particular strategy to the crisis in question and the remaining crises are allocated 
their strategies. Essentially, the possible combinations of strategies remain the same. Each matrix 
captures the payoff to a particular crisis for a particular combination.  
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 In our model, every crisis is assigned a priority L on a scale of 1 to 10 to indicate its 
severity. This priority is used as a weight in a payoff function to facilitate the calculation of the 
loss to a crisis(s).  
Payoff to kth strategy of ith crisis when the crises t ≠ i choose sm≠i, l Є {S1, S2... Si-1, Si+1, Sn} is 
given by, 
  
( )( ) ( )( ) 






∗−−∑∑
= =
≠≠=≠
n
t
m
j
itjliStjkiStjjliStj Lorror
1 1
,,,,,,
 - constant 
 
liStjr ,, ≠  Resources contributed by the jth resource center of lth strategy of crisis Ct≠i  
kiStjr ,, =  Resources contributed by the jth resource center of kth strategy of crisis Ct=i  
oj           Total number of resources available at resource center Rj  
Lt≠i  Priority of crisis Ct≠i  
M Number of resource centers 
n Number of crises 
 
 The term ( )( )kiStjjliStj ror ,,,, =≠ −  refers to the ratio between the resources contributed by 
a strategy and number of resources available from that resource center after allocating to the crisis 
in question, Ci. The term ( )jliStj or ,, ≠  refers to the ratio between the resources contributed by a 
strategy and number of resources available from that resource center without allocating to the 
crisis in question, Ci. The difference captures the loss to the crises Ct≠i and the priority of the 
crises adds a weight to the loss. The last term of the expression, constant, is value which is either 
0 or ∞. If the combination of strategies is feasible, then constant = 0, else constant = ∞ (or a very 
high number).  
Consider a combination of strategies, {s1, p, s2, q, ...., sn, r}. Let {r∑1, r∑2, ..., r∑m} be the sum of 
resources. 
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     (r1, r2, ..., rm)  belonging to s1, p   
   +  (r1, r2, ..., rm)  belonging to s2, q  
   + ...... .................... 
   +  (r1, r2, ..., rm)  belonging to sn, r  
    ___________ 
    (r∑1, r∑2, ..., r∑m) 
 
If r∑i ≥ oi for any i = 1, 2, ..., m, the combination of strategies becomes infeasible.  
 
4.4   Algorithm to Approximate Nash Equilibrium 
 We apply a variant of the Scarf-Hansen fixed-point algorithm [69, 70] to approximate a 
Nash Equilibrium point in our noncooperative game. The algorithm is based on a combinatorial 
theorem [69] which is expressed in terms of a primitive set. Consider a collection of h-
dimensional vectors X = (x1, x2, ...., xh) of the form (m1 /D, ..., mh /D) with each value greater than 
or equal to -1 and summing up to D which is a very large number, typically a multiple of the 
number of crises. Let the numerators of the vectors in X be [69], 
   m11 m12 .... m1h 
   m21 m22 .... m2h 
   M =    .    .    . 
     .    .    . 
   mh1 mh2 .... mhh 
 
The above matrix is a primitive set if and only if and there is a rearrangement of the columns and 
a permutation of the labels of the columns, I(l) such that[69], 
1.  The lth column is identical to column l-1, except for the two rows I(l)-1 and I(l) 
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2.  mk,l = mk,l-1 + 1 for k = I(l)-1 
    mk,l = mk,l-1 – 1 for k = I(l) 
Note: For l = 1, l-1 = h. Similarly, I(l) = 1, I(l) – 1 = h 
Fig 3.9 shows the steps of the algorithm used to compute the Nash Equilibrium solution. As 
shown in the figure the output is a probability vector p = (p1, p2,..... pi... pn). pi is a probability 
distribution over the strategy set Si of crisis Ci.  
  pi = {pi,j} where j ≤ n and i ≤ gj, total number of strategies in Sj 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.9 Algorithm to Approximate Nash Equilibrium 
Algorithm: NashSolve - Approximate Nash Equilibrium 
Input: n – number of crises, X, Payoff matrices 
Output: Probability vector p 
 
Calculate h = Total number of strategies of all crises – n +1 
 
While label of xj ≠ 1 
 Let xj be an arbitrary nonnegative vector from X. We associate it with the probability vectors 
 ( jnjj ppp ,...., 21 ) as follows: 
   t0 = 0 and ti = si -1 where i = 1, 2,..., n and si is the number of strategies of crisis Ci 
    ∑
−
=
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1  where j ikp , ≥ 0 
 if j isip ,  ≥ 0 then 
  Let Bki = Bki ( jnjijij pppp ....,,.., 111 +− ) be the expected payoff to a crisis it uses its kth 
  strategy  and ki is the lowest index for which 
  ikiB (
j
n
j
i
j
i
j pppp ....,,.., 111 +− ) ≥ Bki ( jnjijij pppp ....,,.., 111 +− ) 
  The vector xj is labeled ∑
−
=
++
1
0
1
i
u
iu kt , where i = min{ j lslpl ,| > 0 and kl ≠ si} 
  Perform replacement step 
 end 
 
 if j isip , < 0 or 
j
isi
p
,
= 0 for all i or ki = si for all i with 
j
isi
p
,
 > 0 then 
  x
j is labeled 1  
  Terminate algorithm 
 end 
end  
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We compute maxj (pi,j) for each i 
The Nash Equilibrium solution is given by,  
    ( ){ }jij pii sNS ,max,=  
maxj (pi,j) corresponds to the strategy with maximum value of probability among strategies of a 
crisis. In the event that there are two strategies with identical probabilities, we pick the one with 
the lower cost to the crisis. 
 
4.5 Software Implementation 
 Crisis management encompasses a whole range of activities from “sensing” a crisis to 
deployment of resources to monitoring of crisis development.  The objective of our work is to 
provide an automated mechanism for determining the number of units assigned to each crisis 
location based on priority and requirement. In this work, we have implemented a tool that  
 
Fig 4.10 Overview of Crisis Management System 
Crisis Alert Mechanism 
eg. “Sense and Respond System” 
 
Crisis Damage Assessment 
Mitigation of crisis and deployment of 
resources 
Monitor crisis development and other 
possible crises eg. CMS 
Recovery 
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determines an optimal allocation of resources in a multi-crisis environment.  The user provides a 
set of inputs to the system, namely, resource capacities, crisis requests, crisis priorities and 
response time information. The software evaluates the information using the underlying algorithm 
and presents the user with an optimal allocation of resources from each center. In Fig 4.11, the 
grey box indicates where our tool for allocation of resources to crises will fit into a crisis 
management model. 
 
4.5.1 System Input and Output 
 Every system is unique in the nature of inputs fed into it and the output presented to the 
user. Below are the specifications of the input and the output of our system: 
Input: 
• Number of crises (2 - 5 crises)  
• Number of resource centers (2 – 10 centers) 
• Resources requested by each crisis (8 – 15 resources) 
• Resources available at each resource center (2 – 10 resources) 
• Priority of each crisis (1 – 10; 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest) 
• Time taken to travel between crisis and resource center (in minutes) 
 
Output: 
Allocation consisting of combination of resources contributed by each resource center 
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4.5.2 Object-Oriented Design 
 We have used an object oriented design to implement our solution because of the two 
main benefits: 
Maintainability – This is achieved through a simplified mapping to the problem domain, which 
results in less analysis effort, less complexity in system design and easier user verification. 
Reusability – Segments of the structured code can be reused by adding new functionalities with 
slight or no modification. This reduces implementation time, localizes the modifications in code 
when a change in implementation is required and also increases the possibility that prior testing 
has removed bugs. 
 The programming language used to implement it is C++. It was chosen because of its 
ability to program in a C-like style, or an object-oriented style or both and also its ability to utilize 
the predefined classes and be able to create user-defined classes to characterize the features of the 
input. Object oriented design allows us to organize data into discrete, distinguishable entities 
called objects. A single object has a state and behavior associated with it. For example, in our 
work, crises and resource centers are objects. Each has its own characteristics and behavior. A 
crisis is described in terms of it severity, requests and location. A resource center is described in 
terms of its capacity.  Furthermore, each object has its own characteristic behavior. For example, 
each crisis generates its strategy set.  
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4.5.3 Overview of Classes and Functions 
 We have the following four classes with object functions in our implementation: 
Table 4.1   Overview of Classes Used 
Class Attributes Behavior 
Resource Center Name, Capacity - 
Crisis Name, Priority, Number 
of Strategies, Pointer to 
Strategy Set, Response 
time from each 
Resource center 
 
• Recursively generates all possible 
allocations from resource centers 
• Adds a strategy to its set 
• Sorts its strategies based on cost 
 
Payoff Matrix Name, Number of 
Crises, Number of 
combinations, Structure 
for each Combination 
• Generates rows and columns of a 
matrix 
• Computes payoffs 
Nash Primitive Set, X Vector, 
Probability Vector, D, n, 
k array and t array 
• Computes the Nash Equilibrium 
 
 
The following functions have been used: 
RecNum()  
• Class : Crisis 
• Input : Number of resource centers, resource center capacities 
• Function : Generate strategies for a crisis from the available resources from each center 
 
AddStrat() 
• Class : Crisis 
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• Input : Strategy of a crisis 
• Function : Add strategy to a crisis’ strategy set 
 
costSort() 
• Class : Crisis 
• Input : Strategy of a crisis 
• Function : Locate the ordering of a strategy based on its cost 
 
compareStrategy() 
• Class : Crisis 
• Input : Strategies having the same cost 
• Function : Determine ordering of two strategies with same cost 
  
GenerateComIndex() 
• Class : PayoffMatrix 
• Input : Number of crises 
• Function : Generate indexes for combination of strategies belonging to different crises 
generateComIndex() 
• Class : PayoffMatrix 
• Input : Number of crises 
• Function : Generate indexes for combination of strategies belonging to different crises 
 
getRowStrategy() 
• Class : PayoffMatrix 
• Input : Number of crises 
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• Function : Generate strategies in each row of payoff matrix 
 
getColumnStrategy() 
• Class : PayoffMatrix 
• Input : Number of crises, Strategy set of each crisis 
• Function : Generate combinations of strategies in each column of payoff matrix 
 
getPayoff() 
• Class : PayoffMatrix 
• Input : Number of crises 
• Function : Compute payoffs in the payoff matrix of each crisis 
 
selectedStrategy() 
• Class : Nash 
• Input : Crises, resource centers, payoff matrices 
• Function : Determine the optimal allocation for each crisis 
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Fig 4.11 Workflow Model of the Proposed System  
 
 
 
 
 
Optimal Allocation of Resources 
Crisis Request Resource Center Capacity Priority Response Time 
Generate Strategy Set for each Crisis 
Apply Constraints on the Strategies in each Set based on 
- Crisis Request 
- Resource Center Capacity 
Compute Cost of each Strategy and place 
it in Ascending order 
Generate Combinations of Strategies and Construct 
Payoff Matrices 
Calculate Payoffs for each Strategy Combination  
in the Payoff Matrices 
Apply Hansen’s Algorithm to Compute 
Nash Equilibrium 
Obtain Probability Vector and determine Strategies 
that form Nash Equilibrium 
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CHAPTER 5 
    EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
 This chapter presents a set of experimental results to verify the efficacy of the solution 
obtained using our implementation. The implementation has been divided into three phases – 
generation of strategies, computation of payoff matrices and finally, the generation of the Nash 
Equilibrium solution. For the integration of the three phases, the output of each phase is made 
compatible for the next step. The user inputs information regarding number of crises, requests, 
response times and criticality levels. C++ is the programming language chosen for implementing 
our tool to obtain an optimal solution. The object-oriented characteristic of C++ facilitates 
modeling of the characteristics of players and strategies, and the modularization of the 
implementation.  
 In this chapter, we observe the performance of our approach in various crisis scenarios by 
varying the inputs and noting its effects on execution time and quality of the solution. It is logical 
to assume that as the dimensionality of an input set increases, so does the execution time of an 
implementation. In our implementation, the process of generating strategies and the computation 
a Nash Equilibrium are time intensive tasks and we examine the effect of increasing number of 
crises on the execution time. Also, the total availability of resources in a resource pool versus the 
total demand or requests made by crises are contributing factors in determining the quality of the 
solution.  
 We have performed experiments on various test cases by altering inputs such as crisis 
requests and resource center capacities. The test cases are used to study the effects of inputs on 
the time taken to reach a solution and also to determine the quality of a solution. Furthermore, we 
 53 
apply the fairness measures as described in [79] to quantify the feasibility and fairness of the 
implementation. All experiments were run on a Sun Fire V880 UltraSPARC III server that 
features eight 900 MHz processors and 32 GB of memory running the SunOS.  
  
5.1 Fairness 
 Typically, in a priority based system, a high priority event would receive its request and 
the lower priority event would receive less than its fair share and possibly starve due to lack of 
resources. This is not very different from a first-come-first-serve principle where the more critical 
event is sent ahead in line to claim its share of resources. Although, it would seem logical to 
allow a more critical event to satisfy its request, such a scheme suffers from a high degree of 
unfairness. A priority-based system would perform reasonably well when there is sufficient 
number of resources in the resource pool. However, the problem arises when the total demand 
exceeds the total supply. Higher priority crises satisfy their requests, while lower priority crises 
events suffer from starvation due to inevitable shortage. In a crisis environment, this is 
unacceptable as starvation of a lesser priority crisis could lead to further loss in life and property 
and increase the possibility of worsening of a crisis scenario. 
 Generally, a system is deemed to be fair or unfair based on whether or not it meets certain 
requirements or not. Generally, a system is considered fair if it meets certain criteria on 
throughput or delay, and it is considered unfair if these criteria are not met. For example, a 
scheduling algorithm is fair or unfair depending on whether any user receives a throughput of x 
bits/sec or not. In our system, fairness would be determined by whether or not a crisis receives its 
share of resources. We use the fairness concepts of [79] to determine the fairness of our 
implementation. In our approach, we compare the best-cost strategy of a crisis with the actual-
cost strategy, i.e. the cost of the strategy that is assigned as the Nash Equilibrium solution. A 
measure of fairness of the system can be measured in terms of the self-fairness of the individual 
crises. The proportion of the cost associated with crisis j that is deemed to be fair is given by,  
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Here, actualjt ,cos  is the cost of the strategy assigned to a crisis as part of the Nash Solution.  
The definition of the self-fairness of a given user is, 
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The values Ck are normalization constants. Their objective is to ensure that the maximum value of 
the weighted average fairness is unity and the maximum occurs when each user consumes its fair 
share of the resources. The average fairness of the system is given by, 
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The average fairness value of F ranges between 0 and 1. The value of unity results when a crisis 
consumes resources using a strategy with the lowest possible cost.  
 Tables 5.1 (a-d) show the fairness measure for test cases with varying differences 
between demand and supply.  Every crisis attempts to select a strategy from its set of strategies 
that costs the least. We observe a slight decrease in fairness as the total request for resources from 
all the crises exceeds the total resources available from all the centers.  
 
Table 5.1 Fairness Measures 
Demand vs. Supply Degree of Fairness 
Total demand 21%-50% less than total supply 0.837309 
Total demand 1%-20% less than total supply  0.827117 
Total demand = Total availability 0.833342 
Total demand 1%-20% greater than total supply 0.803526 
Total demand 21%-50% greater than total supply 0.805155 
    (a)  Crisis Scenario with 2 Crises 
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    Table 5.1 Continued 
Demand vs. Supply Degree of Fairness 
Total demand 21%-50% less than total supply 0.811523 
Total demand 1%-20% less than total supply  0.848788 
Total demand = Total availability 0.891354 
Total demand 1%-20% greater than total supply           0.71144 
Total demand 21%-50% greater than total supply 0.781591 
    (b)  Crisis Scenario with 3 Crises 
 
Demand vs. Supply Degree of Fairness 
Total demand 21%-50% less than total supply 0.822978 
Total demand 1%-20% less than total supply  0.818603 
Total demand = Total availability 0.845423 
Total demand 1%-20% greater than total supply 0.710171 
Total demand 21%-50% greater than total supply 0.691537 
    (c)  Crisis Scenario with 4 Crises 
 
Demand vs. Supply Degree of Fairness 
Total demand 21%-50% less than total supply 0.789292 
Total demand 1%-20% less than total supply  0.769231 
Total demand = Total availability 0.769231 
Total demand 1%-20% greater than total supply 0.769858 
Total demand 21%-50% greater than total supply 0.769231 
    (d)  Crisis Scenario with 5 Crises 
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5.2 Execution Time 
 Although the optimality of the solution is important, the time taken to arrive at an optimal 
solution is an important factor in determining the feasibility of our approach. For example, on the 
occurrence of 3-4 crises simultaneously, a formulation which took more than 1-3 minutes would 
not be tolerated. Every second utilized to construct a solution has a direct effect on the response 
time of the emergency units and consequently on their ability to prevent damage. The nature of 
the problem is such that we are limited in scope in terms of comparison with other works. We 
analyze the implementation by varying the inputs and observing its effects on the runtime.  
 The graphs in Fig 5.1 reveal three important observations regarding the effect of inputs 
on execution time. Firstly, all three graphs show the sudden increase in execution time as the 
number of resource centers increases. As the number of resource centers reaches 8-9, there is an 
exponential increase in the time. In Fig 5.1 (a) and (b), the number of resources in each center is 
increased to 3 and 7 respectively. The trend in exponential increase persists over an increase in 
resources per center with a sudden surge observed around 7-9 centers. The second observation is 
that as the number of resources per center increases, the range of execution time increases 
significantly. The range of execution time when there are 3 resources per center is 0 -14 seconds 
in Fig. 5.1 (b) as compared to a range of 0 – 250 seconds when there are 7 resources per center in 
Fig. 5.1 (a). The third observation is that as the number of crises increases, the execution time for 
the same number of resource centers is higher. For example, in Fig. 5.1 (b), when the number of 
resource centers is 9, a 2-crisis scenario takes around 110 seconds and a 4-crisis scenario takes 
about 225 seconds. These observations typically aid a user in determining the range of an input 
set used to produce an optimal solution within an acceptable time frame.  
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Fig 5.1 Effect on Execution Time Due to Increase in Number of Resource Centers 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.2 Effect of Increasing Number of Crises on Execution Time 
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Another factor which determines the execution time is the number of crisis locations. Fig 5.2 is a 
graph with a fixed number of total resources. Both the series show an increase in execution time 
as the number of crises increases. In the pink series, the number of resources centers is 5 with 7 
resources per center and the blue series is vice versa. Although the total number of resources is 
constant, we observe that the series with 7 resource centers and 5 resources per center has a 
higher execution time with the same number of crises. For ease of plotting the graph, we have 
used the logarithm function to plot execution time. 
 For a fixed set of resource centers, capacities and request, as the number of crises 
increases, the size of a game increases thereby increasing the time taken to arrive at the Nash 
solution. Fig 5.3 shows this increase in the percentage of time taken to compute Nash Equilibrium 
as the dimension of the problem increases.  
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Fig 5.3 Percentage Increase in Computation time of Nash Equilibrium 
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5.3 Statistical Significance of Experimental Results for Execution Time 
 We perform regression analysis on our test data in order to determine the statistical 
significance of our results. We perform linear regression analysis by using the "least squares" 
method to fit a line through a set of observations. By doing so, we will be able to analyze how a 
single dependent variable is affected by the values of one or more independent variables. 
  
Table 5.2 Regression Analysis Results 
 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient of 
independence 
P- Value 
(Confidence) 
Number of crises 3.59 2.64E-12 
Number of resource centers 2.10 5.76E-13 
Number of resources per center 0.61 0.25 
 
 In the linear regression model, the dependent variable is assumed to be a linear function 
of one or more independent variables plus an error introduced to account for all other factors. 
Consider a dependent variable y and an independent variable x, the coefficient of y on x is given 
by, 
     2x
xy
C ∑=  
In our case, we examine execution time as the dependent variable and number of crises, number 
of resource centers and number of resources per center as the independent variables. We observe 
a significant impact of number of crises on the execution time. For every unit change in Log 
(Number of Crises), Log (Execution Time) increases by 3.592021. Similarly, for every unit 
change in Log (Number of resource centers) and Log (Number of resources per center), Log 
(Execution Time) increases by 2.10 and 0.61 respectively. 
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 The p-value is the probability of finding a value as extreme or more extreme is a chance 
given that the null hypothesis is true. A null hypothesis basically assumes that none of the 
variables have any effect on the execution time. In our case, the p-values for number of crises, 
number of resource centers and number of resources per center are 2.64E-12, 5.76E-13 and 0.25.  
 In this chapter, we have examined the various aspects of our solution. We have quantified 
the fairness of our implementation and found fairness measures as high as 0.89. We derived 
significant inferences regarding the relationship between the various input parameters – crisis 
requests, resource availabilities and number of resource centers. Finally, we evaluated our test 
cases to understand the dependent and independent variables in the system and also verified the 
confidence of our test cases. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 Crisis management has gained considerable importance over the last few years and the 
automation of allocation of emergency services is a logical step toward erasing human error. Each 
crisis in a multi-crisis scenario makes a request for a certain number of resources. A conflicting 
situation occurs when there is a shortage of resources or competition for resources from the same 
center. Although, each crisis has varying degrees of severity it is highly essential to cater to each 
crisis’ request in the best possible manner. We have proposed an approach using game theory to 
allocate an optimal number of resources in a multi-crisis environment. Our method is a novel way 
of modeling a crisis scenario in a game theoretic framework and obtaining an allocation of 
resources that benefits all the crises in the game.  
 We have examined the effects of various input parameters like number of crises, resource 
capacities etc on the execution time. We have examined the effect of increasing crisis on the 
overall execution time of the system. Although, the implementation is affected significantly by 
the dimensions of the inputs, it has shown a degree of fairness of up to 0.89 in its results and can 
be used as a basis for modeling other resource allocation problems and obtaining feasible 
solutions.  We have performed a linear regression analysis on our test cases and found the degrees 
of dependence between the variables and verified the confidence of our test cases. 
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6.2 Future Work 
 In the experiments that we performed, we restricted ourselves in the number of resource 
centers and the number of resources per center due to constraints on execution time. We need to 
investigate additional schemes to prune strategy spaces more effectively and improve the 
definition of a strategy in order to enhance the performance of the algorithm with increased 
dimensionality of the input set. The process of generation of strategies provides scope for 
parallelism which could improve execution time. Also, we need to explore additional factors that 
can be incorporated to enrich the payoff function like traffic delays, crisis growth probability, etc 
in order to obtain the best possible representation of a real life crisis environment and improve the 
quality of the solution.   
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